

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

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INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 2363

E.O. 11652: GDS

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SUBJECT: SOVIET-NORWEGIAN RELATIONS

BEGIN SUMMARY. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET-NORWEGIAN
RELATIONS WERE SUMMARIZED BY DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS VIBE IN JUNE 13 LUNCHEON WITH DCM
AND EMBOFF, AND ALSO DISCUSSED IN JUNE 15 MEETING
BETWEEN AMBASSADOR AND FOREIGN MINISTER FRYDENLUND.
SOVIET AMBASSADOR ROMANVSKIY HAS RAISED AGAIN THE
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ISSUE OF A CONSULATE IN TROMSO; THE NORWEGIANS HAVE

PRESSED THE SOVIETS TO SET A DATE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS ON DELIMITING THE CONTINENTAL SHELF IN THE BARENTS SEA; SOVIETS APPEAR SENSITIVE TO NORWEGIAN NAVAL VISITS TO SVALBARD, AS POSSIBLE PRECEDENT FOR VISITS TO THE NEW AIRPORT THERE BY NORWEGIAN MILITARY AIRCRAFT. END SUMMARY.

1. IN MEETING WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR ROMANOVSKIY BEFORE HIS RETURN TO USSR ON JUN 7, MINISTER FRYDENLUND RAN OVER THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF RELATION DISCUSSED AT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT. AFTER FRYDENLUND HAD CONCLUDED HIS REMARKS, ROMANOVSKIY COMMENTED THAT WHILE THEIR LEADERS HAD NOT DISCUSSED THE QUESTION OF SOVIET CONSULATE IN TROMSO, THE SOVIET SIDE HAD RAIED THIS MATTER NO SEVERAL OCCASIONS AND FELT THAT THE TESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH A CONSULATE WOULD BE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE AGREEMENT OF BOTH SIDES TO STRENGTHEN THEIR RELATIONS. ROMNOVSKIY ADDED THAT, EVEN IF THE NORWEGIANS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN OPENING A CONSULATE, THERE WAS INTEREST ON THE SOVIET SIDE. FRYDENLUND RETORTED, ACCORDING TO VIBE, THAT THE FAILURE TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE IN MOSCOW REFLECTED, HE HAD THOUGHT, THE FEELING THAT THE ISSUE WAS NOT YET MATURE FOR CONSIDERATION. MOREOVER, IT WAS A MATTER OF RECIPROCITY IN THE NORWEGIAN VIEW, AND THE MINISTRQ OF FINANCE HAD RULED AGAINST THE OPENING OF ANY CONSULATE IN THE USSR AT THIS TIME. VIBE COMMENTED THERE IS ALWAYS A DANGER OF GIVING WAY BEFORE PERSISTENT SOVIET PRESSURE, BUT HE PERSONALLY COULD SEE NO REASON FOR ALLOWING THE SOVIETS TO OPEN AN INTELLIGENCE BASE ON NORWEGIAN TERRITORY. FRYDENLUND SPECULATED TO THE AMBASSADOR THAT ROMANOVSKIY MAY BE TAKING PERSONAL INITIATIVE ON QUESTION OF CONSULATE AND NOT OPERATING UNDER SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS.

2. ON THE QUESTION OF NEGOTIATIONS TO DELIMIT THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, FRYDENLUND PRESSED THE SOVIETS TO SET A DATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS NEXT FALL. HE UNDERSCORED THE FACT THAT NORWAY REGARDS THESE NEGOTIATIONS AS ESSENTIALLY TECHNICAL AND BASED, LIKE THE TALKS

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IN 1970 ON THE 1958 CONVENTION ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF I.E. ON THE EQUIDISTANCE PRINCIPLE. VIBE NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE STRESSING THE POLITICAL CHARACTER OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS SINCE THEY KNOW THEY HAVE SUCH A WEAK LEGAL CASE. FRYDENLUND EXPRESSED SOME DOUBT THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO KEEP THESE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PURELY TECHNICAL LEVEL.

3. OTHER ASPECTS OF SOVIET-NORWEGIAN RELATIONS ARE DEVELOPING NORMALLY. THE NEGOTIATIONS TO CONCLUDE A ROAD TRANSPORT AGREEMENT ARE PROCEEDING AND VIBE EXPECTS IT WILL BE READY FAIRLY SOON FOR SIGNATURE. HE SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN SURPRISINGLY LITTLE FOLLOW-UP ON THE QUESTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN THE ARCTIC. THE SOVIETS HAVE, HOWEVER, INVITED THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLAR INSTITUTE, PROF. GJELSVIK TO VISIT THE USSR AND PRESUMABLY DISCUSS THE PROGRAM.

4. IN HIS MEETING WITH ROMANOVSKIY, FRYDENLUND EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT THE SOVIET CONSUL GENERAL AT BARENTSBERG SHOULD HAVE PROTESTED THE MAY 17 VISIT OF NORWEGIAN NAVAL VESSELS TO SVALBARD. ROMANOVSKIY CLAIMED TO BE UNINFORMED ABOUT THE INCIDENT, BUT COMMENTED THAT NORWAY MIGHT USE THE PRECEDENT OF THE SHIP VISIT TO JUSTIFY SENDING MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO THE NEW AIRPORT ON SVALBARD. HE ADDED THAT, IF NORWAY COULD SEND NAVAL VESSELS TO SVABARD, SO COULD THE USSR. FRYDENLUND SAID HE HAD TOLD ROMANOVSKIY FIRMLY THAT THE USSR COULD NOT RPT NOT SEND NAVAL VESSELS TO SVALBARD EXCEPT IN A SERIOUS EMERGENCY. (COMMENT: VIBE RECALLED THAT A BRITISH FRIGATE HAD ONCE BEEN PERMITTED TO TAKE OFF A STRANDED BRITISH ARCTIC EXPEDITION.)

5. ASKED WHETHER NORWAY MIGHT NOT BE CONCERNED BY THE PRECEDENT OF SENDING NAVAL VESSELS TO SVALBARD, VIBE EXPLAINED THAT IT HAD BEEN PRACTICE FOR MANY YEARS TO DO SO TWO OR THREE TIMES A YEAR AS PART OF NORWAY'S SOVEREIGN RESPONSIBILITY TO SUPERVISE THE DELIMITARIZATION OF SVALBARD, AND HE COULD NOT RECALL A PREVIOUS PROTEST. (COMMENT: A NORWEGIAN CONFIDENTIAL

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NAVAL OFFICER HAS TOLD US OF A PREVIOUS PROTEST BY THE SOVIET CONSUL GENERAL MANY YEARS AGO.) VIBE THOUGHT THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT GENUINELY BE CONCERNED OVER THE POSSIBILITY THAT NORWAY MIGHT SEND MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO SVALBARD. BUT SHOULD THE USSR SEEK TO USE NORWEGIAN NAVAL VISITS TO JUSTIFY VISITS BY SOVIET NAVAL VESSELS, NORWAY WOULD POINT OUT TO THE SOVIETS, HE SAID, THAT IT WOULD HAVE TO AUTHORIZE VISITS BY OTHER SIGNATORIES TO THE 1920 READY.

6. NORWEGIAN OFFICIAL HSAVE BEEN SCRATCHING THEIR HEADS TO EXPLAIN MOSCOW'S DECISION TO PERMIT IRINA PENDIC TO APPLY FOR ENTRY INTO NORWAY, OSTENSIBLY TO VISIT HER BOY-FRIEND, THE FORMER MEMBER OF THE NORWEGIAN EMBASSY IN MOSCOW, HOISTAD, PRESENTLY

SERVING SEVEN YEARS FOR ESPIONAGE. THE MOST
PERSUASIVE EXPLANATION THAT VIBE COULD ADDUCE WAS
THAT SOVIETS WISH TO EMBARRASS NORWAY, WHICH HAS
BEEN MOST ACTIVE AT CSCE IN PRESSING THE USSR TO
GRANT EXIT VISAS IN CASES INVOLVING MARRIAGE OR THE
REUNION OF FAMILIES. DECISION OF IMMIGRATION BUREAU
TO REFUSE IRINA ENTRY WAS UPHELD BY CABINET.
FOREIGN MINISTRY DID NOT PRESS ITS VIEWPOINT
THAT SHE BE ALLOWED TO ENTER IN ORDER NOT TO EMBARRASS JUSTICE
MINISTER WHO IS IN HOT WATER OVER ANOTHER CASE INVOLVING
IMMIGRATION.
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